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Thanks to the Sochi Games, we are raising standards to 
international levels across the board. … The best 
practices from all over the world are coming to Sochi, 
and they will then spread across the entire country, 
creating a sustainable Games Legacy. (Sochi 
Organising Committee, 2012: 4)
Alexander Zhukov
Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Sochi 2014 
Organising Committee
Introduction
In February 2014, the city of Sochi on the Russian 
Black Sea coast and the northern fringe of the 
Caucasus Mountains hosted the XXII Olympic 
Winter Games. Even before the start of the Games, 
the preparations for this mega-event had already bro-
ken records. The event was the most expensive 
Olympic Games, Summer or Winter, ever: the most 
recent estimate from February 2013 put the total cost 
at more than 1.5 trillion roubles, or 51 billion US 
Dollars. At the start of 2013, it was also the largest 
construction site in the world with almost 96,000 
workers labouring around the clock in a city of 
barely 400,000 inhabitants.
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However, as the epigraph suggests, the Olympic 
Games in Sochi were also meant to set the bar for 
sustainability in Russia. When in July 2007 Russia 
was awarded the right to host the mega-event, the 
vision for Sochi 2014 stated that the Games would be 
hosted ‘in a sustainable, inclusive, environmentally 
responsible manner’ and that ‘all key Olympic infra-
structure locations have been selected to ensure max-
imum sustainability and legacy’ (Bidding Committee 
Sochi, 2006: 17, 19). Crucially, the bid book prom-
ised a comprehensive sustainability management 
system, sustainable procurement, carbon neutrality, 
zero waste, extensive environmental impact assess-
ments and multi-stakeholder consultations. The 
mobilisation of international experience was to play a 
central role in delivering on these commitments. 
Organisers modelled the Olympic sustainability 
agenda on international best practice from previous 
editions of the event, which they considered to repre-
sent the state-of-the-art of sustainability.
Yet, as the preparation for the Olympic Games 
proceeded apace, it became clear that the actual out-
comes from this mobilisation of policies from else-
where were going to belie the ambitions. The damage 
to the Mzymta, a major mountain stream in the Sochi 
area, is a case in point for the transformation and 
translation of international best practice in the 
Russian context and the resulting failure to meet 
essential sustainability goals. Extensive construc-
tion, both alongside and right in the bed of the river, 
led to the wholesale destruction of its ecology and 
hydrological regimen. The dumping of construction 
waste and discharge of toxic fluids caused the con-
centration of arsenic, hydrocarbons and phenol to 
exceed the critical permissible threshold up to sev-
eral dozen times, making the water undrinkable for 
thousands of residents. Felling of trees, mining of 
gravel for construction from the river bed and 
straightening of the river altered the runoff regime 
and resulted in a severe increase in the risk of spring 
floods, prompting the development of new evacua-
tion plans (North Caucasus Environmental Watch, 
2013; Novaja Gazeta, 2011; Ševčenko, 2013). It was 
only after concerted pressure and repeated visits 
from the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and national and local non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), as well as the personal inter-
vention of then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, that 
the major companies involved in construction could 
be talked into signing up to a memorandum of under-
standing for restoring the Mzymta basin. It is ironic 
that this restoration is hailed as one of the big mile-
stones of hosting a green Olympics (UNEP, 2011a), 
when the necessity should never have arisen in the 
first place under sustainability principles.
What went wrong in the mobilisation of interna-
tional best practice for Sochi 2014? Where did initial 
aims start to diverge from realities? For what reasons 
and with what consequences? This paper constitutes 
an inquiry into the mobilisation and transformation 
of sustainability knowledge and policy for the 2014 
Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. It traces flows of 
sustainability expertise and standards to Russia and 
examines the reasons behind the transformation of 
the sustainability agenda as well as the overwhelm-
ing failure and isolated successes in achieving the 
goals that the organisers of the Olympic Games in 
Russia set for themselves. It devotes particular atten-
tion to the hitherto underresearched ‘sites of failure, 
absence and mutation’ of policies (Jacobs, 2012: 
419), that is, to the immobilities, or partial and lim-
ited mobilities, as well as to the unexpected transfor-
mations of policies, and the processes behind them.
As a central contribution, the paper proposes a 
framework to think about mobile policies and exper-
tise around the three interlinked notions of transpor-
tation, transformation and translation. Transportation 
looks into the processes of rendering sustainability 
expertise and policies mobile and making them 
move to Russia in the first place. Transformation 
examines what factors altered and constrained the 
implementation of sustainability expertise and poli-
cies in Russia. Translation, finally, evaluates the 
effects sustainability expertise and policies have had 
on the ground in Sochi and to what extent these lived 
up to the self-declared goals of the organising com-
mittee. With this agenda, the paper contributes to 
two important discussions. Firstly, it contributes to 
debates on how to conceptualise the global travelling 
of policies and expertise and their transformation 
and adaptation in specific localities (e.g. McCann, 
2011; Oanca, 2015; Peck, 2011; for the case of sus-
tainability see Blok, 2012; Bulkeley, 2006; Temenos 
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and McCann, 2012). Secondly, it considers the 
potential, preconditions and problems for mega-
events such as the Olympic Games to deliver on the 
wide-ranging, often over-ambitious commitments to 
sustainability that are becoming increasingly com-
mon among organisers (Gaffney, 2013; Hayes and 
Horne, 2011; Horton and Zakus, 2010; Karamichas, 
2013; Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 2012).
Transportation–transformation–
translation: towards a conceptual 
framework for mobile policies
The interest in the global circulation of policies has 
experienced a surge in disciplines such as political 
science, sociology, anthropology, planning and 
human geography in recent years. Although there 
has been research on policy diffusion since at least 
the 1960s (e.g. Walker, 1969), authors have argued 
that both the tempo and the scope of policy circula-
tion have accelerated in recent years with ever faster 
policy cycles and growing demand for out-of-the-
box, tried-and-tested solutions that are seemingly 
straightforward to implement across all sectors 
(McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011). Within political sci-
ence, the rational choice model held sway for a long 
time in the conceptualisation of mobile policies 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Mossberger and 
Wolman, 2003). Actors were seen as evaluating and 
selecting policy alternatives in the presence of near-
perfect information according to their instrumental 
value for a particular situation. As evidence contin-
ued to suggest the inappropriateness of rational 
choice assumptions for many real world policy dif-
fusion processes, epistemic approaches began to 
diversify. Dobbin et al. (2007), for example, pro-
posed four causal mechanisms – emulation, learn-
ing, competition, coercion – to explain the diffusion 
of policy models and Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) 
also stressed the importance of non-voluntarist pol-
icy transfer.
The more recent interest in the mobilities of poli-
cies across a number of disciplines, such as human 
geography, urban planning or anthropology, seeks to 
differentiate itself from the approaches found in 
political science. With the choice of the term ‘mobil-
ities’ it does not propose a unidirectional A-to-B 
notion of transfer but acknowledges the often unpre-
dictable and unruly flows of policies, frequently to 
unexpected places through unexpected routes 
(Healey, 2012; McCann and Ward, 2012b). 
Following a social constructivist paradigm, the pol-
icy mobilities approach is more interested in the 
wider social, cultural and economic embeddedness 
of travelling policies (Peck, 2011: 789) – in what 
McCann and Ward (2012b: 329–330) call situations. 
As such, it seeks to contextualise the travelling, 
adaptation and adoption of policies, problematising 
the politics of knowledge as well as the mutations 
policies undergo when moving from one situation to 
another. Cities and places have their intrinsic logics, 
Eigenlogik as Löw calls it (2012), which engender 
peculiar stocks of knowledge and forms of expres-
sion. Policies thus do not travel easily and mutation 
and failure are always part of the picture.
The policy mobilities approach tends to stay close 
to the embodied practices that establish relations 
between once distant policy sites and between once 
unrelated agents, tracing the movements of experts, 
practitioners, politicians and academics, as well as 
plans, budgets, videos, white papers, slide decks and 
so on (e.g. Healey and Upton, 2010; Larner and 
Laurie, 2010; McCann and Ward, 2011; Peck and 
Theodore, 2010; Peyroux et al., 2012). Theoretical 
inspirations frequently originate in scholarship on 
neoliberalism and governmentality. Mobile policies 
and policy convergence are then considered as corre-
lates of the worldwide rollout of neoliberalism (e.g. 
Peck and Theodore, 2001; Theodore and Peck, 2011; 
Trubina, forthcoming) or as attempts at regulating and 
governing individual behaviour through the invoca-
tion of tried-and-tested global expertise, technologies 
and best practice (Bulkeley, 2006; McCann, 2008).
The growing interest in mobile policies notwith-
standing, authors have diagnosed a lack of concep-
tual work (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5) and 
theoretical inchoateness (Peck, 2011: 774) for both 
the political science and the transdisciplinary pol-
icy mobilities approach. Responding to this need 
for more conceptual groundwork, this paper pro-
poses a framework for conceptualising and 
researching mobile policies. It suggests viewing 
mobile policies as translocal, socio-material net-
works that are shaped by an iterative, three-step 
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cycle of transportation, transformation and transla-
tion (Figure 1). In conceptualising these three terms 
the paper seeks inspiration from theoretical work in 
the social studies of science and actor-network the-
ory, which are concerned with the construction, 
travelling and impacts of knowledge and thus are of 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework for studying mobile policies as socio-material, translocal networks: 
transportation–transformation–translation.
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particular relevance for thinking about the constitu-
tion and effects of mobile policies (e.g. Latour, 
1987; Law, 1991). The shared prefix ‘trans-’ points 
to the fluid, change-related connotations of each of 
the terms, with transportation referring to the 
change of places in mobile policies, transformation 
to a change of content and translation to a change in 
outcomes. I shall explain each of the three terms 
and their conceptual implications in turn.
Transportation is the crucial precondition for a 
policy to come into existence in a new locale. The 
term does not want to suggest that a policy is moved 
from A to B as a closed-off, pre-existing object. 
Rather, transportation points to the necessity of 
mobilising diverse elements of humans and non-
humans from different places to establish relations 
and assemble a translocal network of knowledge to 
then form a policy – a proposed or adopted principle 
or course of action. Picking up on this translocal 
aspect, Latour (1987: 220, emphasis in the original) 
asserts that knowledge means ‘to be familiar with 
things, people and events, which are distant’ (cf. 
Law and Hetherington, 2000: 47). In order to 
acquire such familiarity, these elements need to be 
mobilised and brought together in one place. This 
mobilisation does not occur out of thin air. Similar 
to Dobbin et al. (2007), it can, for example, be a 
response to external requirements, an attempt to 
enhance competitiveness, a result of seeing a policy 
in other places and so on. This also means that there 
is never a pure, unadulterated policy. Policies 
always have time–spatial origins, although these 
might get lost as policy elements are transported and 
embedded into new contexts. The questions of who 
and what moves or is moved, when, where to and 
from, in what form and through what channels are 
crucial for better understanding the preconditions, 
modes and directions of transportation and its influ-
ence on what becomes knowable and what, by con-
trast, remains shrouded in ignorance. For where 
there is transportation, there is also immobility: cer-
tain people and things stay put, they escape the 
attempt to move them or move only partially, and 
this fixity changes what one can become familiar 
with and bring together in one place.
Transformation is inseparable from transporta-
tion. In fact, Latour (1996: 110, emphasis in the 
original) goes so far as to claim that ‘there is no 
transportation without transformation’: as knowl-
edge is embedded into new socio-material relations 
it changes its content and form – sometimes more, 
sometimes less, seldom not at all. Transformation is 
also where knowledge morphs into policy as it is 
attempted to be rendered workable and put into 
political practice. Transformation can have multiple 
causes: it could be the result of the demands and 
interests of new agents that need to be brought on 
board; of the interaction with already existing poli-
cies; of a different interpretation of documents such 
as guidelines and standards; of the encounter with a 
different institutional setting, different organisa-
tional parameters or different legislation; of a trans-
lation between languages. As such, the transformation 
phase is of particular interest, since it departs from 
the assumption of isomorphism, prevalent in much 
of the policy transfer literature (Peck, 2011: 775), 
and devotes more attention to the mutation of poli-
cies. Latour (2005: 39) speaks of so-called media-
tors, travelling people or things that make knowledge 
mobile but at the same time distort and modify the 
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry. 
It is this process of mediation that produces new, 
unexpected turns and directions in policies.
The third and final component is translation, that 
is, the creation of action, which can be similar to or 
different from original intentions, and the align-
ments around it that a policy is able to achieve. The 
original semantic meaning of ‘translatum’ as the past 
participle of the Latin ‘transferre’ is instructive here: 
it refers to ‘that which has been carried across’ and 
thus to the outcomes of transfer. Translation, if suc-
cessful, creates ‘convergences and homologies by 
relating things that were previously different’ 
(Callon, 1980: 211). It produces a cohesive, organ-
ised whole, or what Latour (1987: 131) calls a ‘black 
box’. Policies are intended to align the state of things 
on the ground with their programmatic intent, but 
vary in their success to do so. A focus on translation 
examines how a translocal network is turned ‘from a 
heterogeneous set of bits and pieces each with its 
own inclinations, into something that passes as an … 
actor’ (Law, 1992: 386) – or where, more often than 
not, it fails to achieve this. As a part of this, it can 
also look at the response to the implementation of 
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policies from diverse sides, such as the general pub-
lic, civil society or state and business organisations, 
whether supportive, critical or neutral. Translation is 
not the end point of a linear process: translated poli-
cies can be transported again, snapped up in other 
locations and the cycle of transportation, transforma-
tion and translation starts anew. In fact, as the link 
between ‘transformation’ to ‘transportation’ in 
Figure 1 shows, it is conceivable for a policy that has 
never been put into practice to be taken elsewhere.
The transportation–transformation–translation 
framework differs in crucial respects from existing 
approaches to conceptualise mobile policies. For 
political science, Marsh and Sharman (2009: 282) 
note that scholars in international relations ‘have 
generally bracketed-off the question of effective-
ness’, which this framework explicitly addresses 
with the aspect of translation, thus focusing on both 
processes and outcomes of mobile policies. It also 
avoids privileging either structural explanations, 
such as competitive pressure, or agential ones, such 
as the influence of experts and gurus, for the transfer 
and diffusion of policies (cf. Marsh and Sharman, 
2009: 275). Instead, it takes an agnostic view in 
which the explanation of mobilities emerges through 
the description of processes establishing new rela-
tions and severing old ones. This is in line with the 
actor-network theoretical approach, which disavows 
the structure/agency duality but rather sees the social 
as a circulating entity (Latour, 1999: 17). As such, 
this framework does not seek to generalise about 
causes and processes for policy mobilities and trans-
national policy adaptations, but rather shows a sensi-
tivity to individual cases and circumstances that has 
sometimes been found lacking in the political sci-
ence literature (Benson and Jordan, 2011: 375; 
Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 273). In particular, it 
demonstrates a greater openness towards whom or 
what qualifies as a valid agent to be considered in 
research: besides numerous non-state actors, agents 
can also be material things that shape or redirect 
mobile policies in new directions.
For the fledgling transdisciplinary policy mobili-
ties approach, on the other hand, the transportation–
transformation–translation framework offers a more 
systematic way of both conceptualising and also 
researching mobile policies, as well as the attendant 
immobilities and mutations. The actor-network, con-
sisting of a heterogeneous, distributed mix of human 
and non-human elements, is well-suited to describ-
ing policies as translocal, fleeting, becoming associ-
ations of heterogeneous parts rather than as uniform, 
pre-existing wholes (cf. the use of ‘assemblage’ in 
McCann and Ward, 2012a; McFarlane, 2011). In its 
close association of circulation with transformation, 
the framework gives due account to the central 
aspect of the mutation of policies in the course of 
transfer. As such, the framework allows accounting 
for the multiple partial or limited mobilities, immo-
bilities and the mutations of policies that are rather 
the rule than the exception. In short, the transporta-
tion–transformation–translation framework helps 
thinking through where, when and why policies 
move, in what forms and through what mechanisms, 
how policies change, and what effects they have 
once it is attempted to implement them. The remain-
der of the paper sets out to demonstrate this concep-
tual value added empirically for the case of the 
mobilisation of sustainability policies for the Winter 
Olympic Games in Sochi 2014.
Sustainability mobilities and the 
Olympic Games
In recent years, scholars have found increasing evi-
dence of the diffusion and convergence of environ-
mental and sustainability policies across national 
borders. This is particularly true within the European 
Union, where environmental policy convergence at 
the national level was mostly due to harmonisation 
between member states (Liefferink and Jordan, 
2005), but also among industrialised states more 
generally (Holzinger et al., 2008). At the sub-
national level, authors have examined transnational 
networks for sustainability policy learning and 
adoption between cities and municipalities (e.g. 
Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Blok, 2012; Bulkeley, 
2006). As one of the key results, authors observed 
that, despite intentions to the contrary, best practices 
remained sticky and did not travel and take root 
elsewhere easily through these networks, thus limit-
ing the potential for profound policy change. 
Instead, the circulation of knowledge often rather 
contributed to a discursive reframing through which 
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new understandings of policy problems arose 
(Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004).
The Olympic Games are a particularly interesting 
case for examining the circulation of sustainability 
knowledge and policies, for they involve organising 
essentially the same event with the same require-
ments in a different location every two years, thus 
encouraging the re-use and diffusion of knowledge 
from previous events (Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 
2012). Mega-events can thus ‘act as powerful agents 
of technology transfer and technical norm diffusion, 
with a wide mimetic potential in both geographic 
and public policy sector terms’ (Hayes and Horne, 
2011: 750). Organising ‘Green Games’, at least by 
name, has become de rigueur for host cities. It was 
primarily the host cities that pushed the development 
of the environment and sustainability agenda in the 
Olympic Games. The first concrete measures and 
policy proposals for incorporating environmental 
concerns in the Olympic Games originated primarily 
with the organisers of the Lillehammer Games, for 
example (Cantelon and Letters, 2000). It was the 
Olympic Games 2000 in Sydney that for the first 
time proposed a comprehensive environmental pro-
gramme, setting environmental guidelines for host-
ing the event even before being selected as a host in 
1993. It was Vancouver 2010, the predecessor of 
Sochi 2014, that made the move from a focus on the 
environment to a wider concern with sustainability, 
followed by London with the 2012 Summer Games. 
Despite significant shortcomings in delivering on 
their commitments, these two host cities have gener-
ally been regarded as raising the bar for expectations 
in the area of Olympic sustainability (Holden et al., 
2008; Horton and Zakus, 2010; Karamichas, 2013, 
but see the critical accounts of Boykoff, 2011; Hayes 
and Horne, 2011).
It is important to note that the IOC has rather been 
a follower than a leader in strengthening sustainabil-
ity concerns in the organisation of the Olympic 
Games, often acting in response to organising com-
mittees’ initiatives. The IOC issues no hard-and-fast 
requirement for Games hosts: documents such as the 
Olympic Agenda 21 or the sustainability guide pro-
vide a general framework and point out what organ-
isers can do, but not what they should do. This 
laissez-faire policy has two important implications. 
Firstly, the definition of what a ‘sustainable Games’ 
means is left largely to the respective organisers and, 
hence, there exists no unified understanding of what 
actions ‘sustainability’ includes between different 
editions of the Olympic Games. There can even be 
divergent, contradictory and changing understand-
ings within the same edition of the Games, as the 
case of Sochi will show. What is more, the IOC pro-
vides guidance on sustainability, but unlike other 
areas of the preparation for the Olympic Games, it 
does not exercise strict control. Secondly, lacking 
definite requirements from the IOC, host cities seek 
out previous hosts’ experience in designing and 
implementing sustainability actions. In recent years, 
the passing on of knowledge between Olympic hosts 
has thus become a common phenomenon – and so it 
has for Sochi.
Sustainability and Sochi 2014
Contrary to the ambitious sustainability agenda for 
Sochi 2014, environmentalism has not been high on 
the political agenda of the Russian state since at least 
the start of the 2000s. While environmental protec-
tion enjoyed a brief spell of importance with state 
institutions after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, and in fact was one of the causes citizen 
protests rallied around during the period of glasnost 
in the late 1980s, Vladimir Putin’s inauguration as 
president in May 2000 ushered in a period of wide-
spread deinstitutionalisation and degradation of 
environmentalism (Mol, 2009; Oldfield, 2005). 
However, for the Olympic Games Putin promised an 
about-turn. He declared that ‘in determining priori-
ties – money or ecology – we choose ecology. If the 
balance of nature is upset, this could lead to a situa-
tion that would be impossible to restore for any 
money’ (quoted in UNEP, 2008).
The geographical location of the Olympic Games 
in Sochi and the scope of the construction programme 
underscored the necessity of taking environmental 
concerns seriously. Sochi is situated in the foothills of 
the Caucasus on the Russian Black Sea coast. The 
snow sports took place in the village of Krasnaja 
Poljana, situated in the fragile ecosystem of the 
Western Caucasus Mountains, a United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
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(UNESCO) natural world heritage site. All of the 
venues and most of the infrastructure had to be con-
structed from scratch, resulting in a total bill of about 
USD 50 billion and the most extensive construction 
programme of any Olympic Games (Müller, 2011). 
What is more, construction of venues occurred right 
adjacent to the Caucasus Nature Reserve (protected 
under the strictest international regime according to 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources (IUCN) category Ia) and on 
the territory of Sochi National Park.
In an effort to live up to the promise of hosting 
Green Olympics, sanctioned by Putin’s public decla-
ration, an extensive programme was put in place. It 
envisioned wide-ranging changes across six areas 
termed ‘healthy living’, ‘harmony with nature’, ‘bar-
rier-free [i.e. accessible] world’, ‘economic prosper-
ity’, ‘modern technologies’ and ‘culture and national 
values’ (the range of envisioned activities detailed is 
too extensive to report here, but see Sochi Organising 
Committee, 2012). The Russian government’s inten-
tion was to project the momentum beyond Sochi and 
spread these changes across the whole of Russia, as 
becomes evident from Alexander Zhukov’s state-
ment cited at the beginning. This goal tied into a gen-
eral trend in Russian urban and regional development 
strategies to launch ambitious large-scale projects 
with the intent of signalling both Russia’s claim to 
belong to the leading league of states and positioning 
its cities in the global competition for reputation and 
investment (Dixon, 2010; Golubchikov, 2010; 
Trubina, 2015).
The delivery of the sustainability programme for 
the Olympics was in the hands of the Sochi 
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games 
(OCOG), a non-commercial organisation with 1250 
members of staff at the beginning of 2013, about 15 
to 20 of which worked in the area of sustainability. 
The Russian government, however, continued to be 
involved in major decisions, in particular in those 
that fall outside the decision-making power of the 
Sochi OCOG. In what is known in Russia as the 
‘power vertical’, that is, the hierarchical subordina-
tion of authorities to the government and the 
Presidential Office, politicians at the national level 
co-determined policies and their implementation 
(Müller, 2011).
The sustainability agenda for the Sochi 2014 
Games is documented in the bid book with which 
Sochi applied for hosting the event. As an annex to 
the host city contract that the IOC signs with every 
Games host, the bid book contains the legally bind-
ing commitments of the Sochi OCOG. As such, it is 
the main document against which the IOC and other 
stakeholders measure the success of OCOGs to 
deliver on their claims. For the sustainability agenda, 
the bid book committed to an extensive range of 
activities: a comprehensive sustainability manage-
ment system inside the OCOG, sustainable procure-
ment of inputs, carbon neutrality, zero waste, 
extensive environmental impact assessments, multi-
stakeholder consultations, environmental outreach 
and preservation and enhancement of natural habi-
tats and land surfaces, among others (Bidding 
Committee Sochi, 2006: 71–85). As we will see, 
much of this had been inspired by the previous 
Winter Games in Vancouver and brought to Sochi 
through multiple forms of transportation.
Methodological design
Against this background, the remainder of the paper 
traces the processes of the transportation, transfor-
mation and translation of the Olympic sustainability 
agenda for the 2014 Winter Games in Russia. It 
draws on material from 51 semi-structured inter-
views with staff of the IOC, the local organising 
committees (OCOGs) of the Olympic Games in 
Vancouver 2010 and Sochi 2014 and with contracted 
consultants, conducted between 2010 and 2013. 
Interviews were in English or Russian and inter-
viewees were given the choice between the two 
where they spoke both languages. Interviewees 
included both persons in leading, strategic functions 
– who were more likely to have been involved in the 
circulation of knowledge – and those with more 
operational roles, who are often tasked with imple-
menting certain policies. Interviews focused on the 
sources, content, adaptation and implementation of 
policies in the area of sustainability. Interviewees 
were asked to also reflect on challenges, unexpected 
outcomes and potential divergences from the origi-
nal plans. In addition, insight into the organisational 
processes in the Sochi OCOG was gained during a 
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six-week period of participant observation. The 
manuscript also incorporates documents such as pol-
icies and manuals, websites and news coverage to 
complement the narrative.
The inclusion of material from Vancouver does 
not happen in the sense of a full comparison, which 
is outside the scope of the paper. As the immediate 
predecessor of the Sochi Games, Vancouver served 
as the main reference point and source for knowl-
edge and policies relating to sustainability. It was 
there that staff of the Sochi OCOG went for site vis-
its and to collect relevant documents; it was from 
there that the Sochi OCOG hired consultants that 
were meant to help improve the delivery of the sus-
tainability agenda. Interviews with members from 
the Vancouver OCOG thus were helpful for the 
author to provide a background to the adoption of 
policies there and their packaging for circulation to 
Russia. By contrast, London 2012 or Beijing 2008 
are not included as comparative cases, because these 
had much lower significance in the knowledge cir-
cuits that Sochi was connected to.
Transportation: how the 
sustainability agenda came to 
Russia
When Sochi was awarded the right to host the 2014 
Winter Games in 2007, in the first years the organis-
ing committee paid little attention to the ambitious 
promises in the bid book. The huge scope of the con-
struction programme monopolised efforts and 
resources. The environment function within the 
OCOG did not become operational until 2009 and 
then with only a small workforce. The person to 
head the environment function had come to the 
OCOG from the state environmental oversight 
agency (Rosprirodnadzor) and his first task was to 
familiarise himself with the bid commitments. It 
turned out that most of the commitments in the bid 
book, in his words, were ‘science fiction’. Just like 
many other bid books for sports mega-events 
(Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe, 2012), it had been 
prepared to a large degree by foreign experts, who 
had been hired for this job, because of their previous 
experience with other bids. As one interviewee 
emphasised:
International consultants put into the bid book what 
they knew that the IOC would like and buy, and when 
we got the Games it was all of a sudden like: whoooa, 
we have to deliver on all that and we had no idea how 
to do that. (Interview with staff of Sochi OCOG)
There is thus an understanding that the IOC 
expects certain things to be in the bid book that char-
acterise an internationally viable sustainability 
agenda. The consultants who wrote the bid book, 
however, were not those who had deliver the com-
mitments. The staff in the environment function of 
the Sochi OCOG, often ecologists, however, had 
almost no experience with any of the promises made 
in the bid book. Many of them had a background in 
environmental conservation and protection and in 
the interviews they pointed out that programmes to 
achieve carbon neutrality, zero waste or social 
equity, or to implement a sustainability management 
system were novelties in Russia.
For the Sochi OCOG, it was clear from the outset 
that not all of these objectives could be achieved in 
the short time given. However, the ambitious claims 
had been instrumental in showing to the IOC and the 
world that Sochi was determined to deliver a sustain-
ability programme at the international cutting edge 
– precisely what the IOC would expect. Although 
sustainability was not critical to the operations of the 
Games and a failure to deliver would not have grave 
impacts, the commitments were legal obligations 
under the host city contract, after all, and it was also 
a question of reputation to perform as least as well as 
Vancouver. Since the commitments had been formu-
lated with the help of foreign expertise, this knowl-
edge from elsewhere was sought to be mobilised 
again for their delivery.
So people in the environment function of the 
OCOG sought out the help of their colleagues in 
other host cities, Vancouver in particular. But how to 
get the relevant knowledge to Russia if those people 
were employed elsewhere? One type of knowledge 
that proved to be rather straightforward to mobilise 
were environmental standards. Latour (2005: 230) 
writes about this ability of standards to make things 
and agencies in different places comparable and 
commensurable. A standard purports to be a univer-
sal form of knowledge that works equally well in 
any place on earth, whether in Vancouver or in Sochi. 
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Abstracted from local specificities, it is much easier 
to circulate. Standardisation is thus a way of making 
knowledge mobile. The term ‘standard’ also carries a 
certain normative weight, signalling that its imple-
mentation is expected, normal and indeed desired. 
For Latour, standards are all kinds of abstracted, uni-
fied knowledge that allow coordination among 
agents: these can be legal norms sanctioned by 
standardising bodies, but also mere internal guide-
lines or directives that detail the implementation of 
certain programmes. Standards make sustainability 
efforts and outcomes measurable and comparable 
across space – and thus legible to a global audience 
(cf. Higgins and Larner, 2010; Temenos and 
McCann, 2012).
Standards played a substantial role for mobilising 
sustainability knowledge to come to Russia and for 
living up to international expectations in the field of 
sustainability and orienting the planning for deliver-
ables. For sustainability reporting, the OCOG mobi-
lised the standards of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), as well as the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) 
framework, developed by the IOC, which requires 
tracking 126 indicators and formed an important 
basis of Sochi’s sustainability reports. What received 
particular attention, however, were green building 
standards – a class of standards that has proved to be 
particularly mobile worldwide (Faulconbridge, 
2013). The British BREEAM, a widespread standard 
for assessing the sustainability of buildings, which 
was applied for London 2012, and the North 
American LEED standard, a similar standard applied 
in Vancouver 2010, were considered as models to 
follow. Ten of the newly built competition venues in 
Sochi were to be certified according to BREEAM 
standards. It was the IOC who flagged the applica-
tion of green building standards as accepted interna-
tional best practice in an induction briefing for 
environment:
We did a briefing on environment with the organising 
committee in Sochi very soon after the environment 
person was on board and we realised during that 
briefing that the construction had not taken into account 
any green building codes or any significant 
environmental elements. So that’s something that we 
flagged at the end of that briefing. ‘Sochi you’ve got an 
amazing opportunity, you should be using this to move 
forward Russia and put together building codes’ 
(Interview with staff of the IOC administration)
The crucial precondition for making knowledge 
mobile was that it was documented in written form 
and systematised. This made it easier for staff from 
Sochi to bring the knowledge back home:
The Canadians used a lot of written documents … it’s 
all written, written, written and it’s all very well 
integrated with operations within the organisation. It is 
well systematised, structured and written, and provided 
to the people that had to implement it. (Interview with 
staff of Sochi OCOG)
This respondent reported that he had come back 
from a site visit to Vancouver with 20 GB of data on 
his flash drive that documented the routines and 
work organisation of the Vancouver OCOG in min-
ute detail. The flipside of this easy transportability, 
however, soon became obvious: people felt swamped 
with a large amount of information, in a foreign lan-
guage and often peppered with technical terms. It 
was difficult for them to tell what was more and 
what was less important. Often technical terms had 
no equivalent in Russian, which made it hard to 
understand the concept behind them. What was 
more, documents tended to present the finished 
product of a long process of negotiations and fail-
ures, hiding the contingencies as well as the interme-
diate steps that had been necessary to arrive at the 
final version.
Faced with the overwhelming task of making 
sense of the transported information and finding a 
way of delivering on standards, people in the OCOG 
decided that they also had to mobilise people and 
organisations that were experienced both in imple-
menting and in assuring those standards. The circu-
lation of documents was thus inseparable from the 
circulation of people to work with them. As a conse-
quence, hiring foreign consultants became increas-
ingly common, although Russia had long prided 
itself on being able to pull off the organisation of the 
event on its own. With the express aim of producing 
‘a replicable and scalable approach’ to sustainability 
(statement of a consultant), also to be applied in 
other locations, these consultants helped to imple-
ment the sustainability expectations they had created 
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in the first place. International consultancy firms 
were hired to audit and control the progress in imple-
menting the sustainability agenda or as interfaces 
with the global sustainability community. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, received the 
exclusive rights for the reporting of the Sochi OCOG 
according to the standards of the GRI. The transpor-
tation of standards and the enrolment of international 
consultants thus allowed tapping into sustainability 
knowledge circuits with the aim of securing global 
recognition, or at least global intelligibility of the 
sustainability efforts in Sochi.
Transformation: why and how the 
sustainability agenda changed
Yet, standards also need to be rendered workable in 
local interactions and settings. Three major con-
straining factors necessitated a step-wise modifica-
tion and scaling back of the sustainability agenda: 
dysfunctional governance arrangements, a lack of 
institutional controls and time pressure.
Dysfunctional governance
The governance arrangements, both within the 
OCOG and with contractors, were not conducive to 
facilitating the implementation of the sustainability 
agenda. Firstly, sustainability and environment had 
been created as two separate departments, which 
reported to two different Senior Vice-Presidents. 
Environment was created first, reporting to the 
Senior Vice-President for ‘Construction and 
Transport’. Its major founding rationale was to facil-
itate the environmental impact exercises for the 
extensive construction programme and thus to focus 
on only a fraction of the envisioned sustainability 
programme. The sustainability function was founded 
much later, only about four years before the Games, 
and reported to the Senior Vice-President for 
‘Planning and Integration’. It was conceived as a 
function to take care of the initiatives that had a less 
obviously environmental component, but rather 
related to the social or economic aspects of sustain-
ability. As a consequence, the holistic approach to 
achieve a triple bottom line became fragmented and 
coordination of activities was made more difficult. 
Communication about sustainability issues, both 
inside the OCOG and with the public, became hap-
hazard, with the two departments producing separate 
requirements and separate publications and reports. 
This resulted in a considerable dissipation of the 
thrust of sustainability initiatives.
Secondly, the sustainability agenda was missing 
high-level support from within the OCOG. Whereas 
Vancouver had a Vice-President in charge of sustain-
ability, who reported directly to the CEO, none of the 
higher levels of hierarchy in the Sochi OCOG was 
specifically in charge of sustainability, which made 
it less of a high-priority issue. In the initial formation 
stage of the OCOG, sustainability concerns had been 
pushed to the side in the face of more pressing issues. 
This meant that in the day-to-day operations, sus-
tainability concerns were often brushed aside, 
because they were perceived as a distraction from 
the bread-and-butter business of delivering the 
Games under high time pressure.
The central role of external contractors for deliv-
ering infrastructure turned out to be a further obstacle 
to implementing the sustainability agenda. The Sochi 
OCOG did not develop, manage or own the Olympic 
infrastructure itself, but had an Olympic delivery 
agency, Olimpstroj, with numerous sub-contractors 
in charge. This meant that in order to achieve sustain-
ability goals, both contractors and investors had to be 
first educated about them and then, in the absence of 
prior knowledge about how to achieve sustainability 
standards, assisted in implementing them. This multi-
plied the time and effort required:
Because I don’t produce my [sustainability] products 
and services, I have to make others’ operations green. 
When we say something, we have to help them to 
deliver on this, because otherwise we lose credibility, if 
we are not the ones who can make people deliver. So 
it’s not just like we tell them what to do, but we also 
have to make it happen. … In Russia it’s almost 200% 
of the work [that was needed in Vancouver]. (Interview 
with staff of the Sochi OCOG)
Lack of institutional controls
The enforcement of compliance was further 
aggravated, because of a general absence of institu-
tional controls to safeguard environmental and 
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sustainability concerns in Russia. State agencies nei-
ther had the expertise nor the power to enforce sus-
tainability standards. Many of the objects had been 
planned and sited without due environmental assess-
ment of risks and impacts. Environmental rules and 
regulations that were nominally in place were 
flaunted and fines, if imposed at all, were symbolic at 
best and thus had no directive influence to discourage 
violations (Odincov, 2010). Even the intervention of 
UNEP, the official partner and watchdog of the IOC 
with regard to sport and environmental issues, did not 
speed up or improve this process. Although the Sochi 
OCOG had signed a memorandum of understanding 
with UNEP in 2009, making transparent its environ-
mental commitments and submitting to independent 
UNEP assessment of progress, repeated UNEP visits 
did not yield meaningful results. UNEP stopped pub-
lishing updates about the situation in Sochi in 2011, 
when it became clear that results were falling far 
short of expectations (UNEP, 2011b: 1).
While NGOs had been active in publicising and 
campaigning against the widespread environmental 
damage in the wake of construction activities, no 
constructive relationship could be established that 
would guarantee that their demands would be heard. 
NGOs were concerned that their demands were not 
being taken seriously and their participation abused 
for greenwashing, while the OCOG complained that 
NGOs were not interested in greening but rather in 
obstructing Olympic operations (Roux, 2010). In the 
face of continuing environmental destruction and 
mere lip service to environmental commitments, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Greenpeace 
and a number of other NGOs decided to boycott fur-
ther talks with the organisers from 2010, so as not to 
legitimise greenwashing. With both state and civil 
society controls weak, the enforcement of compli-
ance with standards and requirements was severely 
curtailed. Even though standards and policies had 
been transported to Russia, their application could 
not be enforced on an institutional basis.
Time pressure
The dysfunctional governance and lack of institu-
tional controls were compounded by high time 
pressure on implementing sustainability goals from 
the bid book. With the late foundation of the envi-
ronment and sustainability functions in the OCOG, it 
proved impossible to acquire and establish stand-
ards, seed them to contractors and construction com-
panies as well as to other departments within the 
OCOG, have them implemented in the design and in 
the construction process, and then monitor this 
implementation within the less than five years before 
the Games that the environment function had been 
operational. What exacerbated the situation was the 
unprecedented scale of the construction programme 
of over USD 50 billion, with more than 320 facilities 
constructed and close to 100,000 construction work-
ers on site. The scale of the task led to the self-per-
ception that environment and sustainability were 
always behind, trying to catch up with the develop-
ments on the ground:
Three years before the Games it’s too late to start 
anything … I’m in the position when I’m six months 
after where I was expecting to be. (Interview with staff 
of Sochi OCOG)
Change: scaling back
The combined influence of these three factors 
resulted in a profound transformation of the sustain-
ability programme. The ambitious scope had to be 
scaled back and a new emphasis was put on the envi-
ronmental component, which also had a more imme-
diate equivalent in Russian (ėkologija). As a 
consequence, many items of the sustainability agenda 
from Vancouver, although mobilised and moved to 
Sochi, were not taken up. Others were implemented 
haphazardly or reduced in scale. One example is the 
initial commitment to host carbon-neutral Games 
from the start of the preparation period to the finish of 
the Games, which was scaled back to offsetting the 
additional emissions during the Games and not fur-
ther communicated as a goal starting with the sustain-
ability report for 2009/2010. Another is the promise 
from the bid book to host zero waste Games, which 
was downgraded to ‘reducing waste’ after the provi-
sion of the necessary infrastructure could not be com-
pleted in time (Novaja Gazeta, 2012).
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In public communication, however, the OCOG 
continued to propagate that it was ‘set to host the 
greenest Games ever’ (PhysOrg, 2013). The concept 
of sustainability proved to be such a strong attractor 
on the global level (Mol, 2010) that it could not be 
dropped from communication with stakeholders and 
an international audience without losing face. The 
scaled-down agenda thus kept sailing under the label 
of ‘sustainability’, but the term started to become 
fuzzier and fuzzier and be applied to all kinds of 
changes in the Sochi region, whether sustainable or 
not, and whether related to the Games or not. The 
sustainability report lists among the sustainable 
achievements, for example, a twofold increase of the 
total load of the energy grid from 440 to 1000 MW 
through the addition of three new gas-fired power 
stations, the construction of 367 km of new roads 
and the fostering of patriotism (Sochi Organising 
Committee, 2012: 125–126, 148). Attaching the 
label ‘sustainability’ in such an arbitrary way to a 
diversity of phenomena undermined the idea of an 
efficient, viable and equitable use of resources to 
enable the long-term maintenance of human well-
being that lies at the heart of sustainability and led to 
contradicting communications about what exactly 
sustainability meant for the Sochi Games. It also 
resulted in a translation of the sustainability agenda 
on the ground that diverged fundamentally from 
what had been envisioned.
Translation: what impact the 
sustainability agenda has had
Irreversible environmental damage and 
excessive scoping
Since the siting of buildings and infrastructure took 
little notice of environmental concerns, the largest 
construction site in the world caused an extensive 
environmental footprint with some irreversible 
damage. Environmental impact assessments and 
audits were not performed and environmental docu-
mentation was not provided for the majority of con-
struction, although mandated by law (Odincov, 
2010). Even an interviewee from the Sochi OCOG 
conceded:
If you talk about the Games, there can be no [positive] 
legacy. We are dealing with pristine environment: there 
is some damage from construction that is irreparable. 
(Interview with staff of the Sochi OCOG)
NGOs and opposition newspapers have drawn 
attention to the most incisive impacts, which 
include an almost complete destruction of the eco-
system and the basin of the river Mzymta, as 
described in the introduction, the discharge of toxic 
waste into water bodies and the inappropriate dis-
posal of construction waste and excavated soil, the 
felling of stands of protected forest and the redraw-
ing of the boundaries of protected areas to allow for 
the building of an access road (North Caucasus 
Environmental Watch, 2013; Novaja Gazeta, 2011; 
Ševčenko, 2013). It is even more cause for concern 
that some of this environmental damage was facili-
tated through the targeted relaxation of environ-
mental jurisdiction. This applies to the law on 
protected areas, which was modified to allow for 
sports mega-events to be held on those territories, 
and the forest code, which was modified to allow 
for the cutting of rare species of trees (Müller, 
2013; WWF Russia, 2010).
Moreover, scoping decisions have happened 
with little regard to sustainable long-term use, so 
that much of the infrastructure is oversized. The 
transport infrastructure – touted as one of the prin-
cipal legacies of the Games – is a case in point. The 
new airport will be able to handle 3800 passengers 
per hour at peak time, which equals a fivefold 
increase over current capacities, but serves a stag-
nating number of tourist arrivals. The capacity of 
the combined rail/road link to the mountain village 
of Krasnaja Poljana is 20,000 passengers per hour, 
which exceeds the number of rooms in the village. 
These gross excess capacities do not correspond to 
the long-term needs of the locality and are at risk 
of becoming underutilised white elephants, as is 
the case so often with infrastructure for mega-
events. Thus, for both siting and scoping, the 
mobilisation of sustainability knowledge happened 
too late or not at all to have much effect on front-
end decisions and the large impacts associated 
with them.
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Limited public engagement and local 
benefits
In addition to the irreversible damage and exces-
sive scoping, the preparation for the Games hap-
pened with limited public engagement of NGOs or 
local residents. This was despite the bid book dec-
laration that promised to work ‘closely with public 
authorities and non-governmental organisations’ 
(Bidding Committee Sochi, 2006: 65). In a study, 
almost 80% of the population reported that partici-
pation in the planning for the Olympic Games had 
been low or very low (Müller, 2012). In some 
instances, the authorities deliberately undermined 
the purpose of public consultations, either ignoring 
the meetings, sending people with no power to 
make decisions or making promises to break them 
just several days later (WWF, 2010: cf. Makarychev 
and Yatsyk, 2015).
Local residents benefitted little from the USD 50 
billion – more than USD 100,000 per capita! – that 
were invested in their region. While property prices 
were pushed up due to the artificial Olympic demand 
and beachfront plots sold to outside investors, the 
local population faced extensive hurdles in getting 
jobs in the construction industry. Firms preferred 
cheaper labourers from abroad, who were also less 
likely to complain about exploitation, violation of 
labour laws and damage to the environment 
(Mitrochin, 2012). It is not surprising then that a 
majority of residents stated that they did not receive 
any benefit from the preparation for the Games 
(Müller, 2012). Residents reacted strongly to the 
failure to safeguard environmental protection. In the 
absence of proper state enforcement of jurisdiction 
and institutional checks, they started to form groups 
to protest for a clean environment – ironically target-
ing the very measures that were supposed to deliver 
it, such as new power plants (Novaja Gazeta, 2012; 
Ševčenko, 2013). Statements that the Games in 
Sochi would contribute to a broad paradigm shift of 
how the public was included in decision-making 
processes and could benefit from large-scale state 
investment did not come true. On the contrary, the 
event turned out to be an elite-led project in which 
the public was often enough perceived as a nuisance 
rather than as a major stakeholder.
Showcasing standards
It is in the area of standards where the sustainability 
agenda can be considered at least partly successful. 
Stakeholders involved in construction went to great 
lengths and costs to implement resource-saving 
technologies in the most high-profile buildings and 
have them certified according to British BREEAM 
standards. These green building standards were 
introduced retroactively: the bid book did not men-
tion them and the original plans did not foresee them. 
This late introduction meant incisive changes to the 
planning and construction process. For the Ice 
Palace, for example, a photovoltaic power supply, 
different light bulbs, heat reusage and climate sys-
tem automation were added, just to mention a few 
modifications. Translating this experience to the 
national level, a national standard for green building 
(ГОСТ Р 54694-2012) was established in March 
2013, drawing on the British and North American 
green building codes.
A number of factors played a crucial role for this 
adoption of green standards. Firstly, there was early 
intervention from the IOC, which helped making 
green standards a top-level priority with the Russian 
government and made early action possible. With 
Vladimir Putin coming out in support of green stand-
ards, the OCOG could enter negotiations with con-
tractors with a higher degree of authority, knowing 
that they had the official backing of the Russian 
President, and did not get caught up in protracted 
negotiations. Secondly, there were regular consulta-
tions that brought on board a wide range of stake-
holders. This approach prevented tardiness or 
outright opposition to this programme from emerg-
ing. Thirdly, there were regular implementation 
reports as well as a widely publicised green building 
recognition programme, with awards given to con-
tractors that excelled in particular green building cat-
egories. This ensured that there was both systematic 
control, as well as official and international recogni-
tion of sustainability efforts, creating incentives to 
implement the standards. Fourthly and perhaps most 
importantly, there was the allure of international 
standards, coming with an ‘imprimatur of excel-
lence, “world-classness”, and track record, wrapped 
in layers of awards, and glowing write-ups’ (Temenos 
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and McCann, 2012: 1393). If Vancouver and London 
had had those international standards, it was impera-
tive for Sochi to have them too in order not to be 
perceived as lagging behind and to allow ‘the Games 
to be an even greater success than London or 
Vancouver’ (Sochi 2014, 2010: 9). Standards ensured 
the recognition of world-classness around the world, 
making it legible to a global audience.
Yet, there remain questions as to the long-term 
success of these green building standards. Standards 
stipulate technical requirements, of which there is no 
lack in Russia. However, experience shows that the 
adverse institutional environment, the ineffective 
nature of environmental regulation and the absence 
of incentives for resource conservation or public par-
ticipation in Russia make it difficult for these to be 
followed through (Crotty and Rodgers, 2012). The 
mediatised spotlight character of the Olympic Games 
caters to a global audience with a short attention 
span. The emphasis on ‘showcasing’ a select few 
examples of ‘best practice’ ignores that those show-
cases were constructed with great effort and at great 
cost for one big event. Whether the application of 
green building standards in a few high-profile sports 
venues will indeed ‘spread across the entire country’ 
(Alexander Zhukov from the epigraph) remains 
unclear.
Conclusion
This contribution has proposed a framework for con-
ceptualising mobile policies as well as the multiple 
mutations and immobilities along three steps of 
transportation–transformation–translation and has 
explored its value for the case of the mobilisation of 
sustainability policies during the preparation for the 
Olympic Games 2014 in Sochi. It has adopted an 
actor-network theoretical conceptualisation of poli-
cies as constituted through a socio-material, translo-
cal network of associations: as policies move, the 
network changes. As such, the transportation–trans-
formation–translation framework puts the link 
between mobile policies and transformation centre 
stage and stresses the role of materials in the produc-
tion of agency. Making use of this framework helps 
to structure research on mobile policies in a more 
systematic fashion and to better understand the 
nature of their (im-)mobility, adoption, adaptation 
and impact in three crucial aspects.
Firstly, the framework incorporates processes and 
outcomes, considering both how and where policies 
move as well as the impacts they have. It thus brings 
together two central facets of mobile policies that 
much of the existing literature has often treated sepa-
rately, tending to concern itself either with pro-
grammes or with practice (cf. Knill, 2005; Marsh 
and Sharman, 2009). Whereas ‘transportation’ repre-
sents the process component, ‘translation’ represents 
the outcome component. Integrating both facets in 
one framework recognises that the results and 
impacts of mobile policies are not independent from 
their circulation. Indeed, quite the opposite is the 
case: the paths and forms of mobility co-determine 
the possibilities of implementation and thus the out-
come of policies. In Sochi, it required both standards 
as a particular form of mobilisation of knowledge, 
high-level personal intervention and extensive pub-
lic promotion for green building codes to be mobi-
lised and taken up in venue construction. Policies 
that did not have comparable global stature and 
authoritative backing were either not brought to 
Russia or ended up foundering and not being trans-
lated into practice.
Secondly, the framework highlights transforma-
tion and multiple immobilities or partial mobilities 
as an inevitable part of circulation: transformation 
forms the tight link between transportation and 
translation. The incorporation of transformation into 
one framework with transportation and translation 
helps to analyse where and why policies start to 
diverge from their initial intentions and fail to 
achieve what they were originally intended to. Some 
policies are only partially mobile, circulation can be 
selective and policies can be taken up in very differ-
ent shapes and forms. The framework thus moves 
beyond the focus on presence and the pervasive 
spread of sameness in existing research on mobile 
policies to also develop a sense of where and why 
mobile policies are absent or different from those in 
other places (Jacobs, 2012: 418–419). In the case of 
Sochi, some policies, experts and standards were 
brought to Russia, while others were not or only in 
parts. A combination of ineffective governance 
arrangements, a lack of institutional controls and 
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high time pressure then was responsible for the over-
whelming failure of the sustainability agenda to live 
up to its initial promises and a broad modification 
and scaling back of the original sustainability 
agenda.
Thirdly, the actor-network theoretical approach 
allows giving adequate importance to both human 
and non-human agents in the mobilisation of poli-
cies and privileges neither structural nor agential 
explanations of mobility. In tracing networks, it 
uncovers the production of agency in specific cases 
and thus can do better justice to existing pathways, 
trajectories and contexts that shape mobile policies 
(cf. McCann and Ward, 2012b: 327; Peck, 2011). 
Standards as non-human agents played a crucial role 
for the translation of the sustainability programme in 
Sochi. As abstracted knowledge in material form, 
electronic or print, it was comparatively easy to 
make them circulate from previous Olympic Games 
to Russia and they secured the global legibility and 
thus recognition of Sochi’s sustainability efforts. In 
addition, the label ‘standard’ suggested that their 
application was de rigueur and a mark of a superior 
level of quality, which made their implementation 
appear even more urgent and desirable.
When drawing up the Olympic sustainability 
agenda, Russia followed international role models 
and expectations of what elements such a programme 
should contain. On the upside, the mobilisation of 
knowledge and policies, paired with the intervention 
of international organisations and the Russian lead-
ership, enabled the creation and implementation of a 
national green building standard where none existed 
before. On the downside, striving to emulate others 
produced over-ambitious commitments. Although 
some sustainability policies were mobilised to come 
to Russia, the subsequent transformation through 
ineffective governance, an absence of institutional 
controls, both at the domestic and at the international 
level, and high time pressure led to irreversible envi-
ronmental damage, oversized infrastructure and lim-
ited public engagement and benefits. This made the 
sustainability policies fall far short of the organisers’ 
initial aims and belied the ambitions to harness the 
Olympics as a vehicle for global norm diffusion and 
environmental modernisation. The gap between 
rhetoric and reality is a persistent one when looking 
at the sustainability commitments of Olympic Games 
hosts (cf. Gaffney, 2013; Hayes and Horne, 2011). 
The difference between Sochi and previous hosts, 
then, is rather one of degrees than one of principle. 
The grand claim to organise ‘the greenest Games 
ever’, almost de rigueur for mega-event hosts, rings 
hollow yet again.
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